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Daniel L. Nagin 
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 50 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing primarily on policy considerations, social science research, and the relevant 
statutory and doctrinal frameworks within veterans benefits law, this article argues 
that Congress should subject the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to a clear 
and enforceable deadline for making initial eligibility determinations on claims for 
service-connected compensation. Despite widespread media coverage of delays in 
VA’s adjudication system and countless oversight hearings and congressional 
proposals for reform, this simple idea – to impose a hard deadline upon VA has 
either been overlooked entirely or drowned out by a preoccupation with other types 
of legislative responses to the VA claims backlog. This article seeks to enter the 
debate about remedying the backlog from a slightly different vantage point than the 
perspectives used to date, one that focuses on the nature of deadlines – including the 
psychology of deadlines, the enforcement of deadlines, and the role deadlines might 
play in promoting perceptions of agency fairness and legitimacy. Along the way, the 
article draws on VA’s own data to reveal the long-standing gap between the agency’s 
timeliness goals and its performance. The reform proposed here is admittedly modest 
in many respects; it is far from a cure all for delay. But it does reflect certain 
fundamental values that should animate any reforms to the VA system: expanding 
enforcement tools, applying lessons learned from past VA failures, and treating 
veterans with dignity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
icture an infantryman who has served two tours of duty, one in 
Iraq and one in Afghanistan.
1
 He has borne the burdens of war in 
countless ways—by risking life and limb for his country, by absorbing 
the mental stresses of multiple combat deployments, and by enduring 
separation from his family and community.
2
 The soldier recently 
completed his term of enlistment and received an honorable discharge 
from the Army. He returned to his home community—it could be any 
community, but, for our purposes, let’s say it’s in Massachusetts
3
—
and tried to resume civilian life as best he could. But, like so many 
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, returning from war, he had 
                                                 
1
 Multiple deployments are one of the hallmarks of these recent conflicts. See 
generally VANESSA WILLIAMSON & ERIN MULHALL, INVISIBLE WOUNDS—
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES CONFRONT A NEW GENERATION 
OF VETERANS 6 (2009); Thom Shanker, Army is Worried of Rising Stress of 
Return Tours to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008
/04/06/washington/06military.html. This vignette is a composite drawn from 
some of the client advocacy undertaken at the Veterans Legal Clinic of the 
Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School. The Clinic provides pro bono 
representation to veterans who have unmet civil legal assistance needs. For an 
example of the Clinic’s work advocating on behalf of a veteran who completed 
multiple combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Ausmer v. Shinseki, 
26 Vet. App. 392, 395 (2013) (applying, in a case of first impression that cited 
the veteran’s difficulty readjusting to civilian life, the Servicemembers Civil 
Relief Act to allow an otherwise untimely disability benefits appeal to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to proceed on the merits). 
2
 The example provided here happens to involve a male veteran. But it could just 
as easily involve a female veteran. Women make up an increasingly significant 
percentage of the active duty and veteran populations. See generally U.S. DEP’T 
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS AND STATISTICS, 
AMERICA’S WOMEN VETERANS: MILITARY SERVICE HISTORY AND VA BENEFIT 
UTILIZATION STATISTICS 3, 8 (2011)(stating that by 2035 women will make up 
15 percent of all living veterans); Joe Burris, Fort Meade VA Outpatient Clinic 





 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 340 
(2012). There were nearly 400,000 veterans living in Massachusetts as of 2012; 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran
_Population.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). 
P 
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difficulty adjusting.
4
 The process of reintegrating into civilian life is 
not easy, and it is not linear. 
Depending on circumstances, each individual may suffer from the 
visible, physical wounds of war or the invisible wounds of war or 
both.
5
 All of these wounds require diagnosis, treatment, and support 
systems of various kinds in order for healing to occur.
6
 And then there 
are the newly strange rhythms of civilian life that must also be 
negotiated.
7
 Absent for the first time in a long while are the structure 
of military life, the mission-oriented focus, and the daily bonds forged 
with fellow servicemembers pursuing a common goal.
8
 Because of 
these and other challenges, the term “reintegration”—the Army’s 
chosen vocabulary—is an imperfect concept for capturing the 
complexity of returning from war.
9
 
As for this particular veteran returning home to Massachusetts, 
imagine that the barriers he encountered upon his return home also 
have a financial dimension.
10
 The veteran—who was given a clean bill 
                                                 
4
 Of course, the burden of “adjusting” to civilian life is not—and should not—be 
seen as solely falling on the shoulders of returning servicemembers. See 
Sebastian Junger, U.S. Veterans Need to Share the Moral Burden of War, 




 See generally INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE 
INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY (Territa 




 Ann Demers, When Veterans Return: The Role of Community in Reintegration, 
16 JOURNAL OF LOSS AND TRAUMA: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRESS 




 Army Community Service , Rear Detachment Commander Computer-Based 




.aspx?ignoretimeout=true. (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). For a searing account of 
the challenges servicemembers face when they return from war, see DAVID 
FINKEL, THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE (2013). 
10
 A. GLASMEIER ET AL., THE CURRENT AND FUTURE LONG-TERM CARE NEEDS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS VETERANS 45 (2013) (stating approximately one fifth of all 
veterans in Massachusetts living at or below 200% of the Federal Poverty 
Level). 
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of health during his Army exit medical exam—did his best to get back 
to work in the civilian world, but has been unable to find employment 
that suits him. Nothing seemed right. Instead of feeling more 
acclimated each week to being home, each week he felt more ill at 
ease. He was not sleeping much—and he was experiencing increased 
anxiety and hyper-vigilance. These stresses were compounded by 
deepening financial pressures. At the moment, the veteran—who is 
unmarried—has no income and is relying on support from extended 
family and friends. A friend, also a veteran, urges the veteran to 
receive mental health treatment and tells him he may have Post-
Traumatic Stress. 
As the veteran seeks out care, he finds himself meeting with an 
advocate to obtain guidance about his potential eligibility for various 
benefit programs and financial assistance. As for access to healthcare, 
the advocate and veteran discuss his options. The veteran states that he 
would prefer to see a local doctor with whom he had an existing 
relationship before his military service—and who is not affiliated with 
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The advocate therefore 
provides information about the veteran’s eligibility for healthcare 
coverage through the MassHealth program. As for financial assistance, 
the advocate and the veteran discuss various programs, including, 
among other things, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) administered by the Massachusetts Department of 
Transitional Assistance; the Emergency Aid to Elders, Disabled and 
Children (EADC) program, also administered by the Massachusetts 
Department of Transitional Assistance; the Veterans’ Services 
Benefits program administered by the Massachusetts Department of 
Veterans’ Services; and the service-connected disability compensation 




During the course of the discussion, the veteran asks a very simple 
and straightforward question that reflects his urgent need for financial 
assistance. The question is this: assuming that he applies to one or 
more of these programs, how quickly will he receive a decision 
approving or denying him benefits? The advocate answers that the 
deadlines are clear—but they vary by program. The advocate proceeds 
to explain that: (1) for the MassHealth program, the agency is required 
                                                 
11
 Veterans’ Compensation for Service-Connected Disabilities, BENEFITS.GOV, 
http://www.benefits.gov/benefits/benefit-details/289 (last visited Sept. 19, 
2014). 
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to make a decision within either forty-five days for most applications, 
or ninety days for applications citing disability as the basis for 
eligibility;
12
 (2) for the SNAP program, the agency is required to make 
a decision within thirty days;
13
 (3) for the EADC program, the agency 
is required to make a decision within thirty days;
14
 (4) and for the 
Veterans Services’ Benefits program, the local agency is required to 
make a provisional decision within ten business days.
15
 
When the discussion turns to the VA service-connected disability 
compensation program, however, there is a very different response. 
The advocate tells the veteran that there is really no answer at all. 
VA’s service-connected disability compensation program, unlike all of 
the other aforementioned programs, is not subject to any statutory or 
regulatory deadline for making initial eligibility determinations.
16
 
The veteran next asks—mindful of the frequent media reports he 
has seen recently about a VA claims backlog and veterans waiting 
months and months, if not years, to receive a decision on a claim—
how long, on average, it actually takes for VA to make an initial 
eligibility decision on a service-connected disability compensation 
claim? He is told that, as of January 2014, the answer is roughly six 
months—much longer than the deadlines for any of the other programs 
about which the veteran has inquired.
17
 
                                                 
12
 130 MASS. CODE REGS. § 516.004 (2014). . 
13
 106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 361.700 (2014); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g) (2012). Certain 
applicants are entitled to “expedited” Food Stamps and must receive a decision 
on their application within seven days; 106 C.M.R. § 365.800 (2014); 7 C.F.R. 
§ 273.2(i) (2012). 
14
 106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 702.160(A) (2014). 
15
 108 MASS. CODE REGS. § 4.02(5) (2014). The regulation requires that, within ten 
working days of an application being submitted, the local Veterans Services 
Officer (VSO) send the completed application, together with a recommendation 
for approval or denial, to the Department of Veterans’ Services (DVS). Note, 
however, that the regulation does not specify a time period by which DVS must 
accept or reject the VSO’s recommendation. Based on the experience of the 
Veterans Legal Clinic, in practice DVS accepts or rejects the VSO’s 
recommendation very soon thereafter. 
16
 Vietnam Veterans of America v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“Congress has not, however, enacted any statutory deadlines that would require 
the VA to adjudicate all disability claims within a definite time period.”). 
17
 VA MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS (January 11, 2014) available at http://benefits.va.gov/REPORTS
/detailed_claims_data.asp. (stating that, as of January 11, 2014, the figure was 
175.2 days); Allison Hickey, Balancing the Record on the Claims Backlog, 
56 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 50 
The veteran then wonders, how is it that he is entitled to an 
eligibility decision within a defined time period for all of these other 
programs, but not for VA benefits? How is it that the federal agency 
charged with caring for veterans—and whose mission is “[t]o fulfill 
President Lincoln’s promise ‘To care for him who shall have borne the 
battle, and for his widow, and his orphan’ by serving and honoring the 
men and women who are America’s Veterans”
18
—is subject to no 
deadline whatsoever for making an initial decision on his claim for 
service-connected benefits? 
This short essay, which expands on a talk delivered at the Veterans 
and the Law Symposium at the University of Massachusetts School of 
Law, uses this vignette as a jumping off point to argue that this should 
not be so. Drawing primarily on policy considerations, social science 
research, and the relevant statutory and doctrinal frameworks within 
veterans benefits law, this essay argues that Congress should subject 
VA to a clear and enforceable deadline—somewhere between 90 and 
125 days—for making initial eligibility determinations on claims for 
service-connected compensation. Despite widespread media coverage 
of delays in VA’s adjudication system and countless oversight 
hearings and congressional proposals for reform, this simple idea—to 
impose a hard deadline upon VA has either been overlooked entirely 




                                                                                                                   
VANTAGE POINT: DISPATCHES FROM THE U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
(March 19, 2013) available at http://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/8995
/balancing-the-record-on-the-claims-backlog/ (reflecting that, as recently as 
March 2013, the answer would have been nearly 100 days longer — 273 days 
on average); see infra Section III for a fuller discussion of VA’s struggle to 
reduce the wait veterans must endure after filing an initial claim for service-
connected disability compensation benefits. 
18
 U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp 
(last visited May 7, 2014). 
19
 For an early voice seeking the imposition of statutory deadlines, see Battling the 
Backlog: Challenges Facing the VA Claims Adjudication and Appeal Process: 
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 109
th
 Cong. 40-42 
(2005) (statement of Robert V. Chisholm, President, National Organization of 
Veterans Advocates)(stating that there “are no deadlines imposed on the VA to 
complete any of the steps in the adjudication of a claim” and urging Congress to 
“impose mandatory timeframes for each step in the VA adjudication process.”). 
One academic article that discusses numerous potential reforms to VA’s 
adjudication process also briefly addresses the utility of imposing a statutory 
deadline for deciding initial claims. Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification, 
2014 Notes on the VA Disability Claims Backlog 57 
As discussed more fully below, imposing such a statutory deadline 
upon VA is a potentially useful reform because, among other things, it 
will: (1) enshrine in law VA’s duty to provide veterans with timely 
eligibility decisions, as opposed to leaving timeliness to agency 
prerogative; (2) incentivize VA to extend, and then reinforce against 
future unknown contingencies, the recent progress it has made in 
reducing the claims backlog; (3) enhance political and judicial 
mechanisms for enforcement; and (4) accord veterans a greater 
measure of dignity during, and confidence in, the VA claims process. 
To be clear, the purpose of this essay is not to analyze in depth the 
causes of the VA backlog, its consequences, or the myriad ongoing 
and potential reforms to VA’s internal processing systems. These 
topics have been addressed extensively elsewhere at various levels of 
detail.
20
 Nor are the ideas offered here proposed as a kind of panacea 
for VA’s woes. Solving VA’s systemic challenges requires insights 
and reforms from multiple disciplines and perspectives, and massive 
change implemented over an extended period of time. Rather, the 
limited purpose here is to enter the debate about remedying the 
backlog from a slightly different starting point, one that focuses on the 
nature of deadlines—including the psychology of deadlines, the 
enforcement of deadlines, and the role deadlines might play in 
promoting perceptions of agency fairness and legitimacy. Along the 
                                                                                                                   
or Transformation? The Current State of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Disability Benefits Adjudication Process and Why Congress Should Modify, 
Rather than Maintain or Completely Redesign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 1, 13 (2008). As for Congress, one House bill does propose that VA be 
required to provisionally approve all initial claims not decided within 125 days. 
H.R. 1739, 113th Cong. (2013). However, to date, that bill has been languishing 
without any action since the day it was introduced, a period of well over a year. 
20
 See, e.g., A 21st Century System for Evaluating Veterans for Disability Benefits 
(Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007) (discussing potential reforms within VA’s 
disability benefit system); The Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation 
Enduring Freedom on the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Claims Process: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm, on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, of 
the H. Comm. On Veterans’ Affairs, 110
th
 Cong. 48-51 (2007) (statement of 
Linda J. Bilmes, Faculty, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) 
available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearing-transcript/the-impact-of-
operation-iraqi-freedomoperation-enduring-freedom-on-the-us) (recommending, 
among other things, that in order to address systemic delays in adjudication 
processes VA should (1) grant all claims when filed and then audit, in manner 
akin to the IRS, a sampling of the claims to review for accuracy and (2) should 
simplify the disability rating categories to yield four basic levels of disability). 
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way, the essay draws on VA’s own data to reveal the long-standing 
gap between the agency’s timeliness goals and its performance. 
The argument unfolds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview 
of the service-connected disability compensation program. Part III 
explores the nature of the VA backlog. Part IV argues that externally 
imposed deadlines can be more effective than internally imposed 
deadlines, specifically in the context of VA service-connected 
compensation benefits. Part V discusses questions of enforcement. Part 
VI explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of imposing a 
deadline upon VA, with particular emphasis on how a deadline might 
affect veterans’ assessment of procedural justice at VA. Part VII 
concludes. 
II. THE SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
PROGRAM 
While the roots of the service-connected disability compensation 
program stretch back to the nation’s founding, the modern version of 
the program has its origins in World War I. In 1917, Congress 
amended the War Risk Insurance Act to allow veterans who incurred 
injuries, or aggravated pre-existing injuries, in the line of duty to 
receive ongoing payment as compensation, based on the severity of 
those injuries and the average loss of civilian occupational earning 
capacity.
21
 The current iteration of the program—the service-
connected disability compensation program—retains these basic 
elements.
22
 Today, for an unmarried veteran without dependents, 
compensation payments range from $130.94 per month (for disabilities 
rated as impairing civilian occupational earning power by 10%) to 
                                                 
21
 War Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 65-20, S. 2133, 40 Stat. 102 (June 12, 
1917); Pub. L. No. 65-90, H.R. 5723, 40 Stat. 398 (October 6, 1917); see also 
James D. Ridgway, Recovering an Institutional Memory: The Origins of the 
Modern Veterans’ Benefits System from 1914 to 1958, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 1 
(2013) (discussing the history of the veterans benefits program); James D. 
Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of 
Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135 (2011). 
22
 U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Federal Benefits for Veterans, Dependents and 
Survivors: Chapter 2 Service-connected Disabilities, available at, 
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/benefits_chap02.asp (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2014). 
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$2,858.24 per month (for disabilities rated as impairing civilian 
occupational earning power by 100%).
23
 
The program is both enormous in scope and enormous in 
importance to veterans with service-connected disabilities. Last year, 
over 3.7 million veterans received service-connected compensation 
from VA.
24
 In terms of the amount of total service-connected 
compensation paid by VA, the most recent public data, from fiscal 
year 2012, shows that VA provided over $44 billion in compensation, 
or $12,542 per eligible veteran.
25
 Such payments play a significant role 
in ensuring that veterans who have lost earning capacity because of a 
service-connected disability can maintain financial stability and 
receive compensation—and recognition—for their sacrifice. 
While there are altogether five steps before VA can issue service-
connected disability compensation benefits to a claimant, there are 
three basic eligibility requirements at the outset: (1) status as a veteran; 
(2) existence of a current disability; and (3) a connection between the 
veteran’s service and the disability.
26
 Once these three requirements 
are met, VA must then (4) assign a rating to the disability—that is, 
determine the severity of the disability according to the standards set 
forth in the Schedule for Rating Disabilities.
27
 Finally, VA must (5) 
determine the effective date of the claim—that is, determine as of what 
date the entitlement to compensation arose.
28
 This five-step process 
                                                 
23
 38 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1114 (2014). It is important to note that the increases in 
payment are not proportional to the rating percentage increase. For example, the 
present difference in compensation between a disability rated 10% disabling and 
20% disabling is $130 vs. $258. Whereas the difference between a disability 
rated 90% disabling and 100% disabling is $1,714 vs. $2,858. For this reason, it 
can be especially important to ensure that veterans entitled to a 100% disability 
rating receive such a rating from VA. In addition, VA must pay higher monthly 
rates (known as “special monthly compensation’’) to disabled veterans with 
certain specific, very severe disabilities or combinations of disabilities. 
24
 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 




 Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006). 
27
 As described above, the rating assigned to the disability corresponds to a 
particular level of monthly monetary compensation. 38 U.S.C. § 155 (West 
2014); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 38 CFR Book C, 
Schedule for Rating Disabilities, WEB AUTOMATED REFERENCE MATERIAL 
SYSTEM (Feb. 27, 2014) http://www.benefits.va.gov/warms/bookc.asp. 
28
 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (West 2014). 
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may seem simple. It is anything but. Each step—even a topic as 
seemingly innocuous as the very first step, which determines who 
meets the definition of a veteran
29




III. THE VA BACKLOG 
A.  Defining the Backlog 
Concerns about delays in the processing of claims at VA are 
nothing new.
31
 However, these concerns have become much more 
intense and highly publicized over the last five years. What was once a 
relatively arcane subject became the focus of front page news,
32
 
                                                 
29
 See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, ch. 3 (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B. 
Abrams eds., 2013) (providing an overview of the eligibility requirements for 
service-connected disability compensation benefits). 
 
30
 See Robert N. Davis, Veterans Fighting Wars at Home and Abroad, 45 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 389 (2013) (discussing the needs of disabled veterans and the 
veterans benefit adjudication system); James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ 
Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: Confronting the New Complexities of 
Veterans Benefits System, 66 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 251 (2010) 
(discussing some of the inherent complexity in the existing system); William L. 
Pine & William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA’s Regulation 
Rewrite Project, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 407 (2009); and William A. Moorman & 
William F. Russo, Serving our Veterans Through Clearer Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 207 (2004). A sense of the program’s complexity is reflected in the current 
2204-page edition of the VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL (Barton F. Stichman & 
Ronald B. Abrams eds., 2013), which is the desk bible for those who advocate 
for veterans within the VA adjudication system and on judicial review. Even the 
question of what constitutes a “claim” for VA benefits is not without dispute. 
See, e.g., Cacciola v. Gibson, 27 Vet.App. 45, 53 n. 2 (2014) (“Although there 
have been efforts to definitively define what is and is not a ‘claim,’ such efforts 
have not produced uniformity”). 
31
 See, e.g., VA BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CLAIMS PROCESSING, PROPOSALS TO 
IMPROVE DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING IN THE VETERANS BENEFIT 
ADMINISTRATION, 3 (1993) (stating that panel was established by the VA Under 
Secretary for benefits to “develop recommendations to shorten the time it takes 
to make decisions on disability claims and reduce the backlog of claims which 
has reached critical levels at many VBA regional offices”). 
32
 See, e.g., James Dao, Veterans Wait for Benefits as Claims Pile Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 27, 2012 at A1. 





 and a recurring topic on a cable 
television comedy show.
35
 What once required lengthy explanations, 
now simply became known in the media and popular culture by its 
three-word shorthand: the VA backlog. 
The current backlog at VA has its source in a number of factors, 
which combined to create a perfect storm that overwhelmed the 
agency and markedly drove up the time it took to decide claims over 
the last few years. A full excavation of the causes of the backlog is 
beyond the scope of this essay. For the moment, it is sufficient to note, 
in general terms, that VA ascribed the backlog to overlapping forces 
related to increased access to, and increased demand for, benefits. On 
the access side, VA has cited: greater awareness among the veterans 
community about VA benefits via social media; improved VA 
community outreach efforts; expanding numbers of medical conditions 
that are presumed by law to be service-connected; and more effective 
use of a VA and Department of Defense program that facilitates the 
submission of disability applications prior to discharge from military 
service.
36
 On the demand side, VA has cited: the toll of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars, the increased survival rates of servicemembers 
because of advances in medicine and battlefield protection, and the 
draw down from those conflicts; an aging population of veterans from 
earlier conflicts whose health is deteriorating; the recession that hit at 
the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century; and increasing 
complexity in deciding claims based on the average number of medical 
conditions contained in each claim.
37
 Other factors that have been 
                                                 
33
 See, e.g., Editorial, VA backlog fails ailing veterans: Our view, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 21, 2013, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21
/va-veterans-disability-claims-backlog-editorials-debates/2683167/. 
34
 See, e.g., Aaron Glantz, VA Backs Off Promise to Fix Veterans’ Claims Backlog, 
THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, (May 22, 2013) 
http://cironline.org/reports/va-backs-promise-fix-veterans-claim-backlog-4571. 
35
 See, e.g., The Daily Show: America’s Heroes Return—Operation Enduring Wait 
(Comedy Central Television Broadcast, May 20, 2013). 
36
 See infra notes 37 and 38. 
37
 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP., PART II, 5, 85 (2013). For further background about the addition of 
medical conditions—including ischemic heart disease, Parkinson’s disease, 
hairy cell leukemia and other types of chronic B-cell leukemia—to the list of 
conditions that are presumptively service-connected for Agent Orange exposure, 
see 75 Fed. Reg. 53, 202 (Aug. 31, 2010); see also VA CLAIMS PROCESSING 
62 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 50 
cited include internal VA challenges, such as delays accessing 
pertinent records held by other government agencies and process-
related and technological inefficiencies.
38
 Finally—and independent of 
these specific access, demand, and related considerations—the sheer 
complexity of veterans benefits in general no doubt plays an important 
role in the backlog too.
39
 
While the VA backlog has attracted considerable attention, its 
precise meaning has proven more slippery. This slipperiness has two 
dimensions. First, what types of claims and what stages of the 
adjudication process should be included in the discussion of delays at 
VA? Second, when should a claim, assuming it is being considered in 
the assessment of delays at VA, be denoted as “backlogged?” 
As to the first question, even within the category of service-
connected disability compensation claims, there are multiple sub-
categories of claims that may or may not be entitled to the same level 
of concern in evaluating processing delays at VA.
40
 For example, one 
might attach different weight to timeliness concerns with respect to 
                                                                                                                   
TASK FORCE, REP. TO THE SEC’Y OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 3, 10 (2001) (citing 
complexity as part of explanation of backlog in 2001). 
38
 VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: CHALLENGES TO TIMELY PROCESSING 
PERSIST, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY GAO-13-453T 
2 (March 13, 2013) ; see A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING VETERANS 
FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS 169-80 (Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007) 
(discussing some of the factors contributing to processing delays at VA as of 
2007); see Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification, or Transformation? The 
Current State of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits 
Adjudication Process and Why Congress Should Modify, Rather than Maintain 
or Completely Redesign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2008) 
(discussing the factors contributing to the backlog as of 2009, including 
proposed reforms); THE VA CLAIMS BACKLOG WORKING GROUP REPORT (Mar. 
2014) (discussing the factors contributing to processing delays at VA as of 
2014); Emily Woodward Deutsch and Terrence T. Griffin, Parsing the 
Paperless Push: A Study of the Latest Efforts to Automate the Veterans’ Claims 
Process, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 117 (2010) (discussing the challenges of 
technological change at VA); Emily Woodward Deutsch & Michael Donohue, 
The Role of the New Media in the Veterans Benefits Arena, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 
183 (2009). 
39
 See, e.g., VA CLAIMS PROCESSING TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS 3, 10 (2001) (citing complexity as part of explanation of 
backlog in 2001). 
40
 See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL 933-55 (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B. 
Abrams eds., 2013) (discussing the various claim types within the service-
connected disability compensation system). 
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decisions on initial claims for service-connected disability 
compensation benefits, decisions on claims to increase the disability 
rating for a condition for which the veteran is already receiving 
service-connected compensation, decisions on claims to reopen 
previously denied claims based on the existence of new and material 
evidence, decisions on requests to revise previously denied claims 
based on clear and unmistakable error, and decisions on new disability 
claims where the veteran is already receiving service-connected 
compensation for a different disability or disabilities.
41
 
Equally important, the VA service-connected compensation benefit 
program is just one of several claims-based monetary benefit programs 
administered by VA regarding veterans’ disabilities. Other VA 
programs include the pension program (which is means-tested and 
provides benefits to wartime veterans who are over age sixty-five or 
are totally disabled for reasons unrelated to their military service)
42
 
and the dependency and indemnity compensation program (which 
provides benefits to qualified survivors of veterans whose service-
connected disability played a more than de minimus role in their death, 
were rated as 100% service-connected disabled for the ten years 
preceding death, or meet another eligibility category).
43
 These 
programs are not as large as the service-connected disability 
compensation program in terms of size and budget, but they are 
substantial programs that play a vital role in providing benefits to 
veterans and/or their survivors. 
Finally, VA does not necessarily reach a final decision on a claim 
in any of these three programs in a single step at a single level of the 
agency. VA is composed of 57 regional offices
44
 and a centralized 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals in Washington, D.C.
45
 The appropriate 
regional office is responsible for making the initial decision on a 
claim. Once the regional office makes the initial decision on a claim, 
there are multiple layers of administrative appeal—with the final 




 38 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (2014). 
43
 38 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (2014). 
44
 See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Regional Benefit Office Websites, 
VA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) available at http://www.benefits.va.gov
/benefits/offices.asp. 
45
 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans’ Appeals, VA.GOV (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014) available at http://www.bva.va.gov/. 
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appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.
46
 Judicial review of VA 
decisions is then available by appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims.
47
 Meanwhile, there are substantive variations in 
appeal types. Some appeals challenge a decision by VA to deny a 
claim. Other appeals involve claims that were granted by VA but the 
claimant disagrees with a portion of VA’s decision, such as the rating 
assigned to the disability or the effective date assigned to the claim. In 
addition to these variables, remands from one level of appeal—
whether from the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims back 
down to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals or from the Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals back down to one of the 57 VA regional offices—
occur with great frequency. In this way, claims—or parts of claims—
are simultaneously climbing the appeal ladder and descending the 
appeal ladder, creating different pressure points in different kinds of 
ways on the VA system.
48
 
In short, the original question—which kinds of VA claims, in what 
programs, at what layer of the adjudicative process, should be factored 
into defining the VA backlog—is enormously complicated. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no unified approach to date. This definitional 
instability has made it harder for various actors to corral the problems 
within VA’s adjudicative processes and to construct remedies. It is far 
beyond the scope of this essay to examine the VA backlog from every 
potential angle. For present purposes, let us focus on the metric upon 
which VA itself has most focused in the backlog debate: the amount of 
time it takes VA’s regional offices to make an initial decision on a new 
claim for service-connected disability compensation benefits. This is 
the metric that animated the vignette with which this essay began—
                                                 
46
 Board of Veterans Appeals, How Do I Appeal?, VA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014) available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/010202A.pdf. 
47
 See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL PART V (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B. 
Abrams eds., 2013) (for an overview of the VA claims adjudication process); 
see Section V infra (discussing in greater detail the judiciary’s role in policing 
VA decisions and processes). 
48
 See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Commentary on Three Cases from the Federal 
Circuit and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as We Approach Twenty-
Five Years of Judicial Review of Veterans’ Benefits, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 136, 
150-52 (2013) (discussing the role VA remands play in fostering delay); James 
D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of Appellate 
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS 
L. REV. 113 (2009). 
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As to the second question—which for the purposes of this essay is 
the much more salient question—VA has been permitted to define 
what counts as a timely decision on a claim, and hence to define the 
scope of its own backlog to a great extent.
50
 As highlighted at the 
outset of this essay, VA is not subject to any externally imposed 
deadline for making initial decisions on new claims for service-
connected compensation benefits. Despite VA’s prerogative in this 
context—or perhaps because of it—VA has defined timely decision-
making in different ways at different points in time. 
For the years 1998-2015—an eighteen-year span—one can find no 
fewer than fourteen different timeliness goals reported by VA 
regarding the number of days in which VA intended to decide service-
connected compensation claims. For 2011, VA even set two different 
annual goals for that year—a paradox revealed by a General 
Accounting Office report.
51
 The report noted the overall goal in 
number of days set by VA for that year was shorter than the sum total 
of the number of days identified by VA as the goal for particular 
phases within the overall claims determination process.
52
 In any event, 
during this eighteen-year span, one can find VA timeliness goals 
articulated by VA ranging from 90 days at the shortest to 250 days at 
the longest, with 157.66 days as the average annual goal. From 
shortest to longest, one can find the following timeliness goals 









                                                 
49
 To be clear, virtually all of the points raised in this essay about delays in the 
service-connected disability compensation benefit program can apply equally to 
the VA pension and dependency and indemnity compensation programs. For the 
purposes of cabining the discussion, however, this essay focuses on the service-
connected disability compensation benefit program. 
50
 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY 







 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP, GAO-02-645T, VETERANS’ BENEFITS: 
DESPITE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS, MEETING CLAIMS PROCESSING GOALS WILL 
BE CHALLENGING (2002) at 1 (noting that this was the goal in 2003); 
VETERANS’ CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMM’N REP. (1998) at 186 (noting that this 
was the goal in 1998). 
























 and 250 days.
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Table 1, below, reflects these changes by year.
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54
 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL 
AFFAIRS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL 
YEAR 1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE 
PLAN 2 (2000). 
55
 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP, GAO-02-645T, VETERANS’ BENEFITS: 
DESPITE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS, MEETING CLAIMS PROCESSING GOALS WILL 
BE CHALLENGING (2002) at 1 (noting that this was the goal in 2003). 
56
 VETERANS’ CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMM’N REP. (1998) at 186 (noting that this 
was the goal in 1998). 
57
 DEP’T. OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP., PART II at 3 (2013) (noting that this was the long-term goal identified for 
the period 2010 to 2015). 
58
 The General Accounting Office noted that even though VA’s 2011 goal was to 
decide claims within 125 days, when one added up the target number of days 
identified by VA for each step of the claims process, the total was 132 days. 
59
 DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 
(2004) at 62, 65; DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2005) at 60; BOOZ, ALLEN, HAMILTON, VETERANS’ 
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION AND PENSION CLAIMS DEVELOPMENT CYCLE STUDY 
(June 5, 2009) at 1. (noting that this was the goal in 2004, 2005, and 2009). 
60
 DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP., PART II (2013) at 28. 
61
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2000 and 2007. U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL YEAR 1999 
PERFORMANCE REP. AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE PLAN II, 2 (2000); 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP., 11 (2007). 
62
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2003 and 2010. U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 45 
(2003); U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2010 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 14 (2010). 
63
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2009. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 8 (2009). 
64
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2008 and 2009. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 4 (2008); DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. II, 28 
(2013). 
65
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2006. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 8 (2006). 
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 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2002. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
2002 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 48 (2002). 
67
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2012. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., II, 28 (2013). 
68
 This was VA’s goal for timely decisions in 2013. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. II, 28 (2013). 
69
 Not only has VA regularly revised its stated goal for timely decision making, but 
it has also revised its method of including or excluding certain categories of 
claims from the same timeliness goals. For example, for a period of time VA 
applied the same timeliness goal to original service-connected compensation 
claims and original pension claims and also claims to reopen. See, e.g., U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146, 
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING 
DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, (May 18, 2000) at p. 3. n. 2 (“In its fiscal year 
2001 performance plan, VBA did not establish separate processing-time goals 
for compensation and pension claims. Instead, [VA’s timeliness goal] is a 
composite goal for all compensation and pension actions requiring disability 
ratings. Initial compensation claims, on average, require more time to process 
than initial pension claims.”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & 
TESTIMONY GAO-05-749T, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: CLAIMS 
PROCESSING PROBLEMS PERSIST AND MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS 
MAY BE DIFFICULT, 1, n. 1 (May 26, 2005). Later, VA created separate 
timeliness goals for service-connected compensation claims and pension claims. 
See, e.g., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., PART II, 6-7 (2013)(setting forth separate timeliness 
goals for service-connected compensation claims and pension claims). In 
addition, in some instances—whether because of definitional instability or other 
factors—one can sometimes locate multiple VA timeliness goals for the same 
fiscal year. Compare U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Reports & Testimony T-
HEHS/AIMD-00-146 VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND 
CHALLENGES FACING DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, 3(May 18, 2000) 
(identifying 74 days as VA’s timeliness goal for year 2000), with U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL YEAR 
1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE PLAN 2 
(2000) (identifying 160 days as VA’s timeliness goal for year 2000). Moreover, 
in 2009, VA shifted from assessing timeliness based on the average number of 
days it took the agency to decide claims to assessing whether all claims were 
decided within the target number of days. See Tom Philpott. Shinseki: Backlog 
Goal Drew Fire, Also Dollars, MILITARY.COM (May 14, 2014) 
http://www.military.com/benefits/2013/07/18/shinseki-backlog-goal-drew-fire-
also-dollars.html.  In these and other ways, there is admittedly a certain apples-
to-oranges quality about charting the evolution of VA’s timeliness goals over 
the years. That said, it seems more than justified to point to VA’s own timeliness 
goals for the purposes of this essay’s thesis. No matter how defined by VA over 
the years, VA has consistently applied the timeliness goals cited here to new 
claims for service-connected compensation benefits, which is the primary focus 
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Of course, VA’s fluctuating timeliness goals only tell part of the 
story. VA’s timeliness goals must be considered against the backdrop 
of how long it actually took VA in a given year to decide the claims 
pending at the agency. Thus, Table 2 charts VA’s timeliness goals 
against the actual number of days on average it took VA to decide 






                                                                                                                   
of this essay. And whether the timeliness goals have been described as the target 
average number of days for claims to be decided or as a deadline to decide all 
claims, by establishing such goals in the first place VA has acknowledged the 
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Table 2: VA’s Goals in Number of Days to Make Decisions on 
Claims Charted Against Actual Number of Days on Average to 
Decide Claims, 1998-2015 
70
 
                                                 
70
 The cite for 205 average number of days to decide claims in 1999 is U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & TESTIMONY T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146 
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING 
DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, 3(May 18, 2000) . Another source identified 
166 days as the figure U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-285520, COMMITTEE 
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS’ FISCAL YEAR 1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL 
YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE PLAN 2 (2000). The first report was dated May 18, 
2000; the second was dated June 30, 2000. The 205 figure has been used in this 
chart. For the actual number of days on average to decide claims for 1998, see S. 
Gen. Accounting Office Reports & Testimony T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146 
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING 
DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING, 4, fig. 2 (May 18, 2000); for 1999, see id.; for 
2000, see DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2002 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 48 (2002); for 2001, see id.; for 2002, see id.; for 2003, 
see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND 
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Table 2 confirms that VA has engaged in a constant game of catch 
up throughout this timeframe. In sum, VA set goals that shifted nearly 
every year and that, even then, it rarely met. Only twice—in 2006 and 
2009—did VA meet its timeliness goals. Given that the agency’s 
timeliness goals changed from year to year, it is not precisely clear 
what can even be made of this putative achievement. The timeliness 
goals for those two years—185 days and 169 days respectively—were 
both above the average timeliness goal (157.66 days) for the period 
1998-2015, not to mention substantially above the long-term 
timeliness goals (74 days and 90 days) that have been cited by VA at 
various points during this same period. Moreover, because VA set its 
timeliness goals before each year began, it repeatedly adjusted those 
goals from year to year based on the realities of the agency’s ever-
changing actual and anticipated burdens.
71
 Overall, aggregating the 
data for the period 1998-2013, and even with its continually shifting 




                                                                                                                   
AFFAIRS, 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 2, 6, 8, 13, 60, 62, 
84, 139, 144, 156, 157 (2004); for 2005, see DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 
2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 6 (2005); for 2006, see DEP’T 
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 8 
(2006); for 2007, see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2007 PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 11 (2007); for 2008, see DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 4 (2008); for 2009, 
see DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP., 8 (2009); for 2010, see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2010 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 14 (2010); for 2011, see U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: TIMELY 
PROCESSING REMAINS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE 7, fig. 3 (2012); for 2012, see 
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 
II, 6, 28 (2013); for 2013, see id. 
 
71
 For example, the General Accounting Office noted in 2002 that VA’s Strategic 
Plan for the period 2001-2006 set forth 74 days as VA’s goal for the number of 
days to decide claims by 2006. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS & 
TESTIMONY, GAO-02-645T VETERANS’ BENEFITS: DESPITE RECENT 
IMPROVEMENTS, MEETING CLAIMS PROCESSING GOALS WILL BE CHALLENGING, 
5, n. 6(April 26, 2002) . Once 2006 arrived, however, VA revised its timeliness 
goal for that year to 185 days, more than double the original goal. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 8 (2006). 
72
 The years 2014 and 2015 have been excluded from this calculation because only 
VA’s timeliness goal for those years—and not its actual average number of days 
to decide claims—is known at present. 
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In 2009, then VA Secretary Eric Shinseki decided that VA needed 
to shed this habit of ever-changing timeliness goals.
73
 VA therefore 
adopted 125 days as the agency’s goal for deciding claims. This 125-
day goal became the demarcation point of the backlog. Claims that 
were pending more than 125 days were part of the backlog. Claims 
that were pending for fewer than 125 days were not part of the 
backlog. In 2013, VA reaffirmed its goal—which it states it intends to 
reach by 2015—to make decisions on all service-connected 
compensation claims within 125 days.
74
 That said, in 2013 VA also 
identified 90 days as a “strategic target” for making decisions on 
claims.
75
 It is not clear when VA intends to apply or meet the 90-day 
“strategic target.” Notably, VA also identified 90-days as the “strategic 
target” in 2003, more than a decade ago.
76
 
B.  Remedying the Backlog 
Amid all of the fluctuations in VA’s goals for timely claims 
processing, and the worsening of the backlog crisis in recent years, VA 
actually began to make meaningful progress in reducing the backlog in 
2013. The number of claims that have been pending for more than 125 
days without a decision fell significantly, from 611,073 claims in 
March of 2013 to 300,620 claims in May of 2014.
77
 VA’s success in 
reducing the claims backlog may have come with a price, however. 
Concerns have been raised that VA has sacrificed accuracy for speed, 
                                                 
73
 See Tom Philpott, Shinseki: Backlog Goal Drew Fire, Also Dollars, 
MILITARY.COM, (May 14, 2014) http://www.military.com/benefits/2013/07/18
/shinseki-backlog-goal-drew-fire-also-dollars.html. 
74
 DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2013 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 




 DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 
45 (2003). 
77
 See Veterans Benefits Administration Reports, Claims Backlog, VA.GOV(last 
visited May 16, 2014) available at http://benefits.va.gov/reports/mmwr_va
_claims_backlog.asp; Josh Hicks, Veterans Affairs’ Backlog of Claims Down 
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and that, by redeploying agency resources to battle the claims backlog, 
VA has permitted its administrative appeals backlog to grow.
78
 
VA reports that it has used a number of strategies in its effort to 
combat the backlog. Among these are the decrease in paper claims 
filed and increased use of technology; streamlined processes; enhanced 
employee trainings; mandatory overtime; and prioritization of the 
oldest claims.
79
 Many additional steps have been proposed. To cite just 
a few: extending VA’s Fully Developed Claims Process;
80
 improving 
the extent to which the Department of Defense and other federal 
agencies are responsive to VA records requests;
81
 and increasing 




Even with VA’s recent progress in reducing the backlog, the future 
is quite uncertain. The number of new service-connected disability 
compensation claims filed by veterans of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is predicted to increase in the coming years, not 
                                                 
78
 In any event, given the recent scandal at VA about record keeping related to the 
timely scheduling of medical appointments, there may be good cause to be 
circumspect about progress related to the disability claims backlog. See e.g., 
Katie Zezima, Everything you need to know about the VA- and the scandals 
engulfing it, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 30, 2014) available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/21/a-guide-to-the-va-
and-the-scandals-engulfing-it/; Teresa Welsh, Views You Can Use: Veterans 
Health Care Backlog Sparks a Scandal, USNEWS, (May 20, 2014) available at 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/05/20/veterans-affairs-health-
care-backlog-causes-a-scandal-commentators-react; The Editorial Board. VA 




 See DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC PLAN TO ELIMINATE 
THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS BACKLOG (2013) 5-10; Disability Claims Backlog 
Reduced by 44 Percent since Peaking One Year Ago Lowest level since Agent 
Orange cases added in 2011, VA.GOV (Apr. 1, 2014) http://www.va.gov/opa
/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2532. 
80
 THE VA CLAIMS BACKLOG WORKING GROUP REPORT 21 (Mar. 2014) . The 
Fully Developed Claims Process “rewards” a veteran with a year’s worth of 
additional benefits when the veteran files a claim that VA can grant within 90 
days because the veteran has already developed and included all of the evidence 
necessary to decide the claim. Id. In this way, the Fully Developed Claim 
program is intended to relieve VA of the resource-intense burden of gathering 
evidence. The program is not without controversy. 
81
     Id. at 30-31. 
82
 Id. at 28-29. 
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decrease.
83
 Advances in science—including a deeper understanding of 
the health hazards posed by burn pits and other environmental 
exposures in Iraq and Afghanistan
84
 and improvements in the 
diagnosis of traumatic brain injury
85
—may increase the number and 
complexity of claims made to VA. Unforeseen changes in veterans’ 
benefits law may also lead to unexpected surges in claims and appeals. 
Finally, just as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—and the toll they 
would take on the nation’s servicemen and servicewomen—could not 
have been predicted, the timing and toll of the next conflict cannot be 
predicted either. 
In addition to all of these contingencies, VA’s commitment to the 
125-day timeline for deciding claims remains tenuous as well. The 
commitment is merely a matter of policy.
86
 The 125-day timeline is 
not enshrined in statute or regulation. Indeed, it is not a deadline at 
all—it is only a policy goal. Another VA secretary under another 
administration could easily revisit the wisdom of the 125-day timeline. 
At the very least, even if another VA secretary did not formally 
abandon the 125-day timeline, it would be simple enough to soften the 
agency’s policy commitment in light of any number of factors. 
Against this backdrop of uncertainty and as debate continues to 
swirl about what must be done to tame the backlog once and for all, it 
is therefore appropriate to consider what additional tools might be 
available in this effort. Given that, at its heart, the backlog is a problem 
about time—about ensuring that veterans receive without delay the 
benefits they have earned—it is only sensible also to think of the 
backlog as raising important conceptual and practical questions about 
the relationship between administrative agencies and time deadlines. 
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 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: 
THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 76-79 (2008). 
84
 See Ken Bastida, Veterans Returning Home From Iraq, Afghanistan Point To 
Open Air Burn Pits As New ‘Agent Orange’, CBS SAN FRANCISCO (May 20, 
2014) available at http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/05/20/veterans-
returning-home-from-foreign-wars-falling-ill-dying-from-new-agent-orange-
iraq-afghanistan-war-soldier-soldiers-chemical-cancer-garbage-incinerator-
service-va/; see also U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA’s Action Plan: 
Burn Pits and Airborne Hazards, VA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) available 
at http://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/burnpits/action-plan.asp. 
85
 See generally TBI in the News, BRAIN TRAUMA FOUNDATION (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014) available at https://www.braintrauma.org/tbi-faqs/tbi-in-the-news/ 
(noting advancements in traumatic brain injury research and diagnosis). 
86
 See Philpott, supra note 73. 
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To date, VA has never been subject to an externally imposed deadline 
for deciding service-connected disability compensation claims.
87
 As 
set forth in the sections to follow, that is a step worth taking.
88
 
IV. EXTERNAL VS. INTERNAL DEADLINES 
Unsurprisingly, psychologists have found that individuals are more 
likely to comply with time deadlines when the deadlines are externally 
imposed, as compared to deadlines that are internally imposed, or self-
generated. In a 2002 study, psychologists measured the potential value 
of externally-imposed coursework deadlines compared to internally-
imposed deadlines among a population of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology students. The study showed that the externally imposed 
deadlines were more effective in inducing the study participants to 
complete the work in question.
89
 This same dynamic also appears to 
apply with respect to agencies.
90
 In sum, the odds seem strong that if 




 It is worth pausing here before proceeding to underscore that delays at VA 
cannot—and must not—be understood in purely abstract terms or solely through 
the lens of administrative law and policy. The real-world harms occasioned by 
delay are felt everyday by individual veterans. These harms include, but are not 
limited to, deprivation of earned compensation, frustration and anxiety, and 
encountering barriers to other benefits—such as VA healthcare—the eligibility 
for which is often linked to antecedent eligibility for service-connected disability 
compensation benefits. 
89
 Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and 
Performance: Self-Control and Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 3 
(2002). See also Dan Ariely and Dan Zakay, A timely account of the role of 
duration in decision making, 108 (2) ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 187, 199 (2001) 
(discussing how decision makers alter their perspective based on their temporal 
orientation to the decision in question and noting that “[r]esearch indeed 
demonstrates that deadlines have a strong influence on behavior”); but see 
Alberto Bisin and Kyle Hyndman, Present-Bias, Procrastination and Deadlines 
in a Field Experiment, NBER Working Paper No. 19874 (January 2014) 
(questioning specific conclusions drawn by Ariely and Wertenbroch about ways 
in which deadlines affect behavior). Most of the research cited here studies 
deadlines within the context of concerns about persons who may or may not 
tend to procrastinate. My point is not that there is a VA backlog because VA 
employees procrastinate; rather, it is that studies of the use of deadlines in other 
contexts can be helpful to thinking about how individual humans assess 
deadlines within the context of a large and complex system subject to time and 
resource constraints. 
90
 Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 
156 U. PENN. LAW REV. 923 (2008) (using empirical study to find that imposing 
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Congress were to impose a deadline upon VA for deciding service-
connected disability compensation claims, on balance VA’s 
compliance rate with that deadline would be greater than its 




To date, the idea of imposing such a deadline upon VA has 
received scant attention.
92
 At first blush, this omission may seem 
strange. Congress creates statutory deadlines in all kinds of 
administrative contexts;
93
 it would seemingly be simple enough to 
create such a deadline for decisions on claims for service-connected 
disability compensation. Although it is impossible to know with 
certainty, Congress may not have been well positioned to consider this 
option because of the conceptual frameworks most often used in 
discussions of VA programs. Specifically, VA’s service-connected 
disability compensation program is frequently analogized to the Social 
Security Administration’s (SSA) disability programs.
94
 There are 
many similarities indeed. 
                                                                                                                   
external deadlines upon agencies tends to increase the pace of the agency action 
in question); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-
Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency 
Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 (discussing enforcement tools to 
police and remedy agency delay); Note, Improving Statutory Deadlines on 
Agency Action: Learning from the SEC’s Missed Deadlines Under the JOBS 
Act, 92 TEX. L. REV. 995 (2014) (arguing that, depending on circumstances, 
statutory deadlines for agency action can help ensure agency acts timely where 
agency would not otherwise do so). 
91
 Of course, efficiency is not—and should not be—the only consideration. 
Questions of accuracy are taken up in Section VI. See infra Section VI. 
92
 See supra note 19; Riley, supra note 38 (briefly referencing the value of 
imposing a statutory processing deadline upon VA that would require VA to 
grant the claim if not decided by the deadline). 
93
 Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 
156 U. PENN. LAW REV. 923, 925 (2008) (“Deadlines requiring agencies to 
commence or complete action by a specific date are common in the modern 
administrative state.”). 
94
 For examples of scholarship that invoke the VA/SSA comparison in one form or 
another, see e.g., James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 48, at 
162-65; Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 
90 NEB. L. REV. 388, 431-33 (2011). For an example of a judicial decision that 
does so, see Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 
(2011). For a broader discussion of the role agency and program analogies play 
in discussions of potential VA reforms, see Rory E. Riley, The Importance of 
Preserving the Pro-Claimant Policy Underlying the Veterans’ Benefits Scheme: 
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Both programs require the collection and analysis of enormous 
quantities of medical and other data. Both programs require a 
determination of disability. Both programs must make use of 
administrative systems to receive, process, and decide an extraordinary 
number of claims. Both programs are large and expensive. Both 
programs employ multiple levels of administrative appeal. Both 
programs interact directly with claimants, many of whom have serious 
health issues and/or financial distress. One could go on. Of course, 
there are also important differences. Whereas VA must determine 
whether a disability is or is not service-connected and must assign a 
percentage rating to each disability, SSA is not concerned with 
determining the origin of disability, nor is SSA concerned with the 
percentage gradations in disability so critical to the VA process. 
Moreover, VA’s duty to assist claimants throughout the administrative 
process is much greater than SSA’s duty. These are just a few of the 
many differences. 
In any event, because SSA has served as such a powerful 
touchstone for discussions about VA’s woes, it is perhaps 
understandable that Congress has not meaningfully considered the 
potential utility of imposing a deadline on VA for deciding service-
connected disability compensation claims. For, SSA is not subject to 
any statutory deadlines for making decisions on disability claims. VA, 
as SSA’s putative closest cousin among federal benefit programs, 
logically would be a poor fit for a statutorily-imposed deadline too. 
Rarely, if ever, heard in discussions of VA are analogies to other 
benefit programs, including programs subject to formal—whether 
statutory or regulatory— deadlines for making decisions on 
applications. To return to one of the programs discussed in the vignette 
at the outset of the essay, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP)—also sometimes still known by its former name, the 
Food Stamp program—is one such example.
95
 Pursuant to 7 CFR 
                                                                                                                   
A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Structure of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits System, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 77 (2010). 
95
 At first glance, SNAP may seem like an improbable comparison to the service-
connected disability compensation program. SNAP is a means-tested program 
for the general population that continues to be marked by the stigma of welfare. 
The service-connected disability compensation program reflects compensation 
that has been earned by veterans through the service and sacrifice in the armed 
forces. There are also important differences in basic structure. SNAP, though 
funded by the federal government, is administered by state and local government 
entities. The service-connected disability compensation program is a pure 
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§ 273.2(g), SNAP applications must be decided within thirty days.
96
 
We might call this an externally imposed deadline because SNAP is a 
program of cooperative federalism: the federal government provides 
funding and establishes the legal framework for the program’s 
operations, but state agencies administer SNAP at the local level and 
are subject to this legal framework, including the thirty-day deadline 
for deciding applications set forth in federal regulations. 
Not only is the thirty-day deadline for SNAP externally imposed, it 
is enforceable through at least four different mechanisms. First, SNAP 
is enforceable through administrative oversight. The Food and 
Nutrition Service, a unit within the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
audits state agencies in order to monitor and enforce compliance with 
federal regulations, including the thirty-day deadline for deciding new 
applications.
97
 Second, enforcement occurs via political oversight. 
                                                                                                                   
federal program. Finally, determining eligibility for SNAP is a far simpler task 
compared to determining eligibility for service-connected disability 
compensation benefits. For these reasons and others, Social Security—not 
SNAP—has been the preferred comparison for VA. But, as discussed in greater 
detail below, SNAP may have a lot to teach VA about the utility of deadlines 
and conceptions of procedural justice. For a discussion of the veterans’ benefits 
system as inheriting potentially contradictory attributes from two different 
public benefit traditions, see Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and 
Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 303 (2004). Moreover, many low-income servicemembers and veterans 
are eligible for and receive SNAP benefits. Alan Pike, “Military Families’ 
Reliance on Food Stamps Hit a Record High Last Year,” THINKPROGRESS.ORG 
(Feb. 18, 2014) http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/02/18/3299971/food-
stamps-military/. 
96
 In some limited circumstances, SNAP applications must be decided more 
quickly (seven days). 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(i) (2012). In other scenarios, applications 
may be decided more slowly (sixty days) based on the fault of the applicant or 
the agency. 
97
 Tyler Dukes, Progress continues toward cutting food stamps backlog 
WRAL.com (Feb. 4, 2014) http://www.wral.com/progress-continues-toward-
cutting-food-stamp-backlog/13355718/#S9jYC9eoL3U3kDzV.99 (stating that 
“Under the gun of a federal ultimatum, state and county health officials cut a 
longstanding backlog of food stamps cases nearly in half over the weekend”); 
Feds say NC has cleared food stamp backlog, NEWSOBSERVER.COM, (April 15, 
2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/04/15/3787197/feds-say-nc-has-
cleared-food-stamp.html (“The state has adequately cleared a long backlog that 
was delaying food aid to North Carolinians, the federal government announced 
Tuesday”); Andy Miller, Georgia officials say food stamp backlog over ONLINE 
ATHENS, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, (June 5, 2014) 
http://onlineathens.com/local-news/2014-06-04/georgia-officials-say-food-
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Congress monitors the work of the Food and Nutrition Service, 
including the extent to which the Food and Nutrition Service is 
fulfilling its obligation to ensure compliance with federal standards at 
the state and local level.
98
 Third, there is enforcement at the individual 
level. An individual applicant for SNAP can pursue an administrative 
appeal.
99
 And fourth, there is judicial enforcement at the group level. 
Where there are systemic failures by a state or local agency in 
complying with the thirty-day deadline for deciding SNAP 
applications, class action litigation can be pursued to enforce the 
agency’s legal duty to decide applications by the deadline set forth in 
the regulation.
100
 The potential availability of attorneys’ fees in these 
suits helps ensure that private attorneys generally take on large and 
costly litigation of this kind.
101
 
These four different enforcement tools—administrative oversight, 
political oversight, individual administrative appeals, and group-level 
judicial enforcement—have, at least on balance, proven effective in 
policing basic compliance with the thirty-day SNAP processing 
deadline in the aggregate across the fifty states. Maintaining a SNAP 
backlog is, simply put, unlawful under 7 CFR 273.2(g). By contrast, 
                                                                                                                   
stamp-backlog-over (“After clearing a backlog of thousands seeking food 
stamps, Georgia officials now are waiting to find out if it might lose millions in 
federal funding.”) 
98
 See History of FNS, USDA.GOV (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) available at http://
www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/HISTORY%20OF%20FNS.pdf. 
99
 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2014). 
100
 See, e.g., Briggs v. Bremby 3:12cv324(VLB), 2012 WL 6026167, (D. Conn 
Dec. 4, 2102) (issuing preliminary injunction requiring state agency to comply 
with federal application processing deadlines); Booth v. McManaman, 830 
F.Supp.2d 1037 (D. Haw.Nov. 16, 2011) (issuing preliminary injunction 
requiring state agency to comply with federal application processing deadlines. 
For an excellent discussion of using litigation as a tool to enforce the federal 
timeliness requirements for SNAP, see Marc Cohan & Mary R. Mannix, 
National Center for Law and Economic Justice SNAP Application Delay 
Litigation Project, CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW: JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND 
POLICY 208-17 (Sept.-Oct. 2012). Many of the lessons learned described by 
Cohan and Mannix from the SNAP context can potentially apply to advocacy 
strategies for the VA context. 
101
 See Bracantelli v. Burns, CIV 04-421 TUC CKJ (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2005) 
(reflecting that settlement agreement in Food Stamp delay case contains attorney 
fee provision for plaintiffs). 
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 “a national disgrace,”
104
 and other similar 
epithets, politicians, advocates, and members of the media have never 
called the VA backlog unlawful—because at present it is not. This 
basic fact produces second order challenges as well. Because VA’s 
deadline for deciding service-connected disability compensation 
claims is merely an internally generated policy goal, and because of 
some of the idiosyncrasies of veterans benefits law, the enforcement 
mechanisms currently available to police delays at VA have, like VA’s 
own timeliness goals, proven far too weak for the job. It is to these 
challenges that this essay next turns. 
V. ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 
Compared to the tools available to police compliance with the 
thirty-day decision-making requirements imposed by federal 
regulations for SNAP, the enforcement tools to police VA’s policy 
goal for timely decision making are, not unexpectedly, far more 
limited. Congress does of course have oversight of VA, including 
oversight of VA’s paradigm for defining and meeting timely decision-
making goals. As the discussion in Section IV illustrated, for more 
than a decade this oversight has not produced much consistency or 
clarity with respect to VA’s timeliness goals. Nor has congressional 
oversight produced much meaningful progress—at least until the very 
                                                 
102
 Brendan Mosley, Roby and Rogers Critical of VA Backlog, ALABAMA 
POLITICAL REPORTER (May 6, 2014), http://www.alreporter.com/in-case-you-
missed-it-2/6220-roby-and-rogers-critical-of-va-backlog.html (quoting 
Congresswoman Martha Roby as stating the VA claims backlog is 
“outrageous”). 
103
 Leo Shane III, , Skeptics doubt VA’s claim of breakthrough on claims backlog, 
STARS & STRIPES (June 19, 2012), http://www.stripes.com/news/skeptics-doubt-
va-s-claim-of-breakthrough-on-claims-backlog-1.180811 (quoting Rep. Gus 
Bilirakis, R-Fla, as stating the VA claims backlog is “unconscionable”). 
104
 Seth McLaughlin, Sen. Mitch McConnell: VA disability claim backlog is 
‘national disgrace’, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 22, 2013 http://www
.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2013/jul/22/sen-mitch-mcconnell-va-
disability-claim-backlog-na/ (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell as declaring the 
VA claims backlog a “national disgrace”); USA Today Editorial Board, VA 
backlog fails ailing veterans: Our view, USA TODAY, August 21, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/21/va-veterans-disability-
claims-backlog-editorials-debates/2683167/ (describing the VA claims backlog 
as “a national disgrace”). 
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recent and still disputed progress—in reducing the claims backlog. So 




It should come as little surprise that other actors in the veterans 
benefit system—namely, veterans and their advocates—have sought to 
fill the void. These actors have attempted to compel VA to make 
timely decisions on disability claims by means outside the realms of 
political and policy advocacy before Congress and VA. Whether at the 
individual or group level, they have found little success—for reasons 
mostly peculiar to veterans’ benefits law. 
Because VA has no legal duty to decide claims within any 
particular length of time, individual veterans often find themselves in a 
kind of black hole when they try to pursue administrative appeals and 
seek judicial remedies for VA’s failure to make timely decisions. 
For starters, the failure by a regional office to issue an initial 
decision—unlike the failure of a SNAP agency to issue an initial 
decision within thirty days—is not understood to give rise to a 
meritorious administrative appeal.
106
 In essence, no matter how long a 
regional office might take to make an initial decision on a claim, there 
are apparently no grounds to pursue an administrative appeal for that 
delay. Nor can a direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims (CAVC) necessarily be had in such circumstances. 
The Court’s jurisdiction on direct appeal is limited to reviewing final 
decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA).
107
 As a practical 
consequence, on direct appeal the CAVC can only review decisions by 
                                                 
105
 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Real Problem with VA? Congress., 
WASHINGTON POST, May 29, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/congress-owns-a-part-of-the-vas-failures/2014/05/29/ab94248e-e5b0-11e3-
8f90-73e071f3d637_story.html (stating that “Congress has held scores of 
oversight hearings about the VA but has failed to produce adequate VA 
performance” and that “Congressional self-scrutiny must also be a big part of 
any meaningful solution.”); Jordain Carney and Stacy Kaper, Who Really Broke 
Veterans Affairs?, NATIONAL JOURNAL, May 21, 2014, http://www
.nationaljournal.com/defense/who-really-broke-veterans-affairs-20140520 
(stating that Congress “cannot claim clean hands” with respect to problems at 
VA, including the claims backlog, and that Congress’s “record of efficacy is 
mixed at best—especially in terms of eliminating the claims backlog.”). 
106
 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a); (b)(1) (2014) (stating that appellate review is initiated 
by filing a “Notice of Disagreement” and that right to file Notice of 
Disagreement is triggered by the “mailing of notice of the result of initial review 
or determination”). 
107
 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a); 7266(a) (2014). 
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the BVA to grant or deny a claim—not a regional office’s failure to 
render an initial decision or the BVA’s failure to recognize a veteran’s 
claimed right to appeal administratively the delay at a regional 
office.
108
 Apart from substantive barriers, the administrative appeal 
process itself is both exceedingly slow and complex. Furthermore, 
once on judicial review before the CAVC, the proceedings become 
both more complex and formally adversarial. Overall, trying to 
construct and pursue an administrative appeal and then direct appeal to 
the CAVC to challenge a delay at a regional office is a daunting, and 
perhaps hopeless, task. 
At present, the only other viable mechanism for an individual 
veteran
109
 to remedy delays in deciding his or her claim is to file an 
original petition for extraordinary relief at the CAVC pursuant to the 
All Writs Act.
110
 The CAVC possesses jurisdiction under the All Writs 
Act to compel VA to decide claims “within a reasonable period of 
time.”
111
 However, the elements necessary to prove entitlement to a 
writ are onerous: the right to the writ must be “clear and indisputable”; 
no alternative avenue can exist to obtain the relief sought; and the 
CAVC must be satisfied that, in the exercise of its discretion, issuance 
of a writ is appropriate.
112
 Moreover, the CAVC has interpreted 
“reasonable period of time” at a high level of generality and in a 
manner reflecting significant deference to VA. According to the 
CAVC, “[w]hile there is no absolute definition of what is reasonable 
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 Maggit v. West, 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000); DeCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. 
App. 52 (2006). 
109
 This essay uses the term “veteran” to encompass not just those meet the 
statutory definition within the veterans benefit system, but also survivors who 
are sometimes entitled to step into the shoes of a deceased veteran to pursue the 
veteran’s claim still pending for service-connected disability compensation 
benefits. This process is known as a claim for accrued benefits. Too often 
interminable delays in the adjudication of claims makes it more likely that a 
veteran will pass away before the claim is fully and finally decided. 
110
 26 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2014). Of course, there are also numerous informal 
mechanisms theoretically available to veterans—such as seeking the 
intervention of an elected official, repeated calls, correspondence, and visits to 
the Regional Office or the BVA, community organizing and protest, and the 
like. Such efforts are sometimes productive. Then again, veterans should not 
have to go to such lengths merely to receive a timely—and accurate—decision 
from VA in their cases. 
111
 See Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 3 (1990). 
112
 Id. at 9-10. 
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time, we know that it may encompass ‘months, occasionally a year or 
two, but not several years or a decade.’”
 113
 
To illustrate the difficulties inherent in this framework, consider 
the following case decided by the CAVC. A veteran filed an original 
claim for service-connected disability compensation in 1998.
114
 That 
claim was still pending and unadjudicated nine years later—in 2007.
115
 
In that year, the veteran filed a petition for extraordinary relief at the 
CAVC under the All Writs Act.
116
 At the CAVC, the VA indicated 
that it was now taking steps to move adjudication of the veteran’s 
initial claim forward.
117
 Importantly, the CAVC noted that in cases 
under the All Writs Act involving alleged delays in adjudicating 
claims, the CAVC must consider the existing demands placed on, and 
the resources available, to VA.
118
 Given all of these considerations, 
and the elements necessary to establish entitlement to a writ, the 
CAVC found the lengthy delay in the case insufficient to justify 
issuance of a writ.
119
 As the CAVC put it, “because [the veteran] has 
failed to demonstrate that any alleged delay in adjudicating his claim is 
so extraordinary that it is equivalent to an arbitrary refusal by the 
Secretary to act, he has not shown a clear and indisputable right to a 
writ, and the Court will deny the petition.”
120
 
In many circumstances, the filing of a petition for extraordinary 
relief can spark VA to act on the underlying claim, even if it does not 
lead to a decision by the CAVC to issue a writ.
121
 But that hardly 
addresses several underlying barriers to the use of the All Writs Act as 
a tool to remedy delays in individual cases. First, many veterans will 
be ill-equipped to file a pleading in federal court in the first instance, 
let alone to engage in ongoing litigation there against counsel for VA 
as part of an adversarial process. Second, securing representation in 
                                                 
113
 Chandler v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 175, 177 (1997) (quoting Erspramer, 1 Vet. 
App. at 10). These cases involved delays in adjudicating remanded claims at the 
agency level. 
114 See James v. Nicholson, No. 07-1750 2007 WL 2938179 (Vet. App. Sept. 21, 
2007). 
115
 See id. 
116
 See id. 
117
 See id. 
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 See id. 
119
 See id. 
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 See id. 
121
 See id. The James case is one such example. 
2014 Notes on the VA Disability Claims Backlog 83 
such cases can prove difficult,
122
 and the availability of pro bono 
assistance is necessarily limited. And third, with or without 
representation, time-consuming and repeated—albeit unsuccessful—
efforts must typically be made to urge VA to act before one can file a 
well-pled petition for extraordinary relief with the CAVC.
123
 In sum, 
the number of veterans who actually file petitions under the All Writs 
Act pales in comparison to the number of veterans who are harmed by 
delays at VA.
124
 While the All Writs Act can provide an important 
mechanism for an individual veteran to seek a remedy for agency 
delays in his or her individual case, for the overall population of 
veterans harmed by delays at VA, the All Writs Act has proven a 
limited tool at best. 
Against this backdrop, veterans have also sought legal relief at the 
group level using alternative vehicles.
125
 But these efforts—though 
creative and bold—have, at least to date, unfortunately proven even 
less successful than individual petitions filed in the CAVC under the 
All Writs Act. 
In Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, two veterans’ advocacy 
organizations filed a class action lawsuit against VA seeking to 
remedy systemic defects in VA’s healthcare and service-connected 
                                                 
122
 When a petition for extraordinary relief sparks VA to act, the case will generally 
become moot, the CAVC will either dismiss or deny the petition, and the 
veteran will be ineligible to recover fees and costs from VA under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act. See Chandler v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 175, 177 (1997) 
(discussing mootness under the All Writs Act); see also Buckhannon v. West 
Virginia Dep’t Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting 
catalyst theory for attorneys’ fees). 
123
 See.e.g., Caprice v. Shinseki, No. 12-1376 2012 WL 2339811 (Vet. App. Jan. 
25, 2013). 
124
 Consider that for the entirety of Fiscal Year 2013, only 193 petitions for writs 
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS (2013). And not all of these 
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502,942 claims for benefits VA identified as backlogged at the end of Fiscal 
Year 2013, one can appreciate how few veterans are able to make use of the writ 
remedy for VA delay. VA MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT, (June 24, 
2013). Available at http://benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/historical/2013
/index.asp. 
125
 There is no class action mechanism available at the CAVC. See Lefkowitz v. 
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439 (1991). 
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disability compensation programs.
126
 The case was filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California.
127
 Among the 
many systemic defects cited in the complaint, the plaintiffs sought a 
remedy—declaratory and injunctive relief—for the widespread delays 
at VA in adjudicating claims for service-connected disability 
compensation.
128
 The plaintiffs’ causes of action were grounded in the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause and focused 
on delays at the administrative appeal stage.
129
 After losing on this 
issue in the District Court, the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a 
reversal from a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
130
 The 
panel, with one judge dissenting, found that the systemic delays in 
VA’s adjudication of service-connected disability compensation 
claims did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act, but they did 
violate the Due Process Clause.
131
 The panel remanded the case to the 




That victory was short lived, however. In an en banc decision, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the panel decision, finding that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction in the first instance to adjudicate the claims 
regarding systemic delays.
133
 According to the en banc decision, the 
only court with jurisdiction to hear challenges to VA’s provision of 
benefits is the CAVC. That conclusion echoed the decision by the 
Sixth Circuit in an earlier class action lawsuit that also had sought 
relief from systemic delays in VA’s adjudication of service-connected 
disability claims.
134
 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit had found 
that only the CAVC possesses jurisdiction over such questions.
135
 Of 
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 Id. at 845. 
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course, as we have seen, the CAVC has very narrowly interpreted its 
power to address delay at VA. And even then, individual veterans face 
enormous barriers to bring such a claim to the CAVC. 
In the end, veterans have found that—at least to date—the 
courthouse doors have either been partially or completely shut to them 
when they seek to challenge delays at VA.
136
 Whether at the individual 
or the group level, remedies for VA delay have simply not been 
forthcoming.
137
 The absence of meaningful administrative and judicial 
enforcement both reflects and reinforces the lack of effective political 
oversight. 
VI. WHY A STATUTORY DEADLINE FOR DECIDING DISABILITY 
CLAIMS? 
In response to this state of affairs—deeply troubling delays, year-
to-year fluctuations in the agency’s timeliness goals, ineffective 
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oversight, and limited enforcement mechanisms—there are compelling 
reasons for Congress to create a statutory deadline (presumably 
somewhere between 90 and 125 days) for VA to decide initial claims 
for service-connected compensation benefits.
138
 
The imposition of a statutory deadline upon VA would promote 
important procedural values that would benefit veterans. Numerous 
studies have documented that the experience persons have with a 
process is vitally important to their overall assessment of a system of 
adjudication—sometimes as important as, or even more important 
than, the substantive outcome of that process.
139
 As one of the leading 
authorities on the social psychology of the law has put it: 
The procedural justice literature has shown that people’s concerns 
about procedural values exist independently of whether they win or 
lose, that people look for more than winning in their interactions 
with the legal system, and that they evaluate the fairness of legal 
processes according to a large variety of criteria.
140
 
Put another way: 
What law has summarized under the ‘due process’ rubric, social 
scientists capture as a bundle of interests, needs, or wants 
described in a variety of ways—vindication, attention, 
accountability, information, accuracy, comfort, respect, 
recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, justice. . .. Research 
on litigants . . . reveals a group of individuals who seek something 
in addition to money.
141
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In light of these lessons from social science, imposing upon VA a 
clearly-established deadline for deciding claims can improve veterans’ 
assessment of VA’s procedural fairness because it can serve as a 
counterweight to the unidirectional way in which VA deadlines 
currently operate. At present, only veterans—not VA—are subject to 
deadlines within the disability adjudication system. To cite a few 
examples, veterans must file notices of disagreement within one year, 
substantive appeals to the BVA within ninety days, responses to BVA-
obtained medical opinions within sixty days,
142
 and appeals to the 
CAVC within 120 days. By contrast, VA is not subject to any 
deadlines in the adjudication of disability claims. There is no deadline 
to decide a claim, to issue a statement of the case in response to a 
notice of disagreement, or to decide an appeal at the BVA. According 




In this kind of legal environment—where all of the deadlines fall 
on the shoulders of the participant rather than on an administrative 
agency beset by intractable delays—it is little wonder that veterans 
have so little faith in the system. Imposing upon VA a statutory 
deadline for deciding claims can serve a valuable role in helping to 
promote the dignity of veterans who interact with this system.
144
 A 




The prior sections previewed the additional justifications for 
imposing a statutory deadline. As discussed in Section IV above, 
externally imposed deadlines tend to be more effective than self-
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imposed deadlines because of basic human psychology. Moreover, the 
incentives created by externally-imposed rather than internally-
generated deadlines can affect the behavior of agencies in similar 
ways. Even when external deadlines have the force of law, compliance 
does not reach 100%—a fact confirmed by looking to SNAP. But the 
point remains—and the VA experience bears this out—internal 
deadlines are too easily manipulated and evaded. 
The external imposition of a clear and stable deadline for deciding 
claims can also encourage more effective long-range planning at VA. 
The backlog at VA grew because the agency suffered from long-
simmering systems defects and was ill prepared for the perhaps 
predictable combination of factors that conspired to overwhelm the 
agency.
146
 Knowing that it could always adjust upward its timeliness 
goals for a given year—something that the agency did with great 
frequency—no doubt influenced VA’s deployment of resources in one 
direction or another as it sought to put out various fires in the system. 
Adopting a firm deadline for deciding claims can provide a powerful 
framework for more effective long-range planning.
147
 VA must apply 
lessons learned from the recent backlog crisis to avoid future backlogs 
in light of the growing needs of aging veterans, the likelihood of new 
conflicts, advances in medicine, greater understanding of 
environmental risks to servicemembers, and other contingencies. 
A statutory deadline for deciding claims can increase Congress’s 
ability to conduct meaningful oversight of VA. Rather than the shifting 
agency-created timeliness goals of the past decades, Congress would 
have a single and stable benchmark by which to assess VA’s 
effectiveness over the long term and from administration to 
administration. To be sure, what Congress does with that information 
is critical; if VA does not meet its statutory obligations, Congress must 
do more than criticize VA in the media and during oversight hearings. 
But it seems only logical that—after years of wrestling with the VA 
backlog—the starting point for Congress should be declaring what it 
means for VA to make a timely decision on a disability claim.
148
 
                                                 
146
 See generally DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC PLAN TO 
ELIMINATE THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS BACKLOG, supra note 79, at 3-4. 
147
 See Battling the Backlog, supra note 19, at 40-42. 
148
 This point echoes an argument advanced by James Ridgway that when courts 
are confronted with unconstitutional delays in the adjudication of claims by a 
federal agency, they should issue “blunt, timeline-based” remedies and then 
allow the agency to determine how it will comply using the expertise the agency 
2014 Notes on the VA Disability Claims Backlog 89 
Congress would also expand the available tools for enforcement by 
establishing a statutory deadline for deciding service-connected 
disability compensation claims. As Section V above discussed, 
veterans have few, if any, meaningful mechanisms for policing delays 
at VA. At present, the primary tool for policing delays is political 
oversight, which has hardly been effective. If Congress created a 
statutory deadline for deciding claims, veterans could enforce that 
deadline through direct administrative and judicial appeals—much in 
the same way SNAP applicants can seek to enforce the thirty-day 
processing deadline to which SNAP is subject. Veterans could also 
presumably continue to seek relief in the CAVC via petitions for 
extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act.
149
 
Even if one accepts all of these rationales for a statutory deadline 
at face value, numerous concerns can certainly be raised about the 
proposal’s potential shortcomings. The service-connected disability 
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compensation program is exceedingly complex; it might simply be 
unrealistic to expect VA to decide all claims within a single deadline, 
especially when one factors in the necessity of obtaining sometimes 
far-flung and decades-old service and medical records and of having 
the veteran complete a compensation and pension exam (or even 
multiple exams) with an appropriate VA medical specialist. Moreover, 
the focus on efficiency—that is, requiring VA to decide all service-
connected claims within a certain number of days—might cause 
accuracy to be sacrificed. Veterans would presumably prefer to receive 
a correct decision—especially if inaccuracy trends in the direction of 
denials rather than approvals of benefits—over a fast decision. 
Relatedly, one might argue that the focus on efficiency on the front 
end—that is, in decision making on initial claims—risks incentivizing 
VA to push the delays deeper into the adjudication pipeline at the 
appeal and remand stages. And if veterans are permitted to appeal a 
regional office’s failure to decide a claim by the statutory deadline, 
appeals and remands might simply further clog the system. Finally, 
creating an administrative appeal remedy will potentially render 
petitions under the All Writs Act no longer tenable because 
administrative remedies for delay will theoretically now exist. In short, 
the proposal offered here might make the situation at VA worse, not 
better. 
These are legitimate concerns worth weighing, but they do not 
undermine the central logic of a statutory deadline. The concerns 
should be understood in context. VA has already identified 90-125 
days as the appropriate period of time to decide not just some claims, 
but all claims. By imposing a statutory deadline, Congress would 
therefore give current agency policy the force of law. Moreover, by 
making the deadline statutory, Congress might help create a natural 
check against ever-increasing complexity in the VA system. Future 
changes in the system whether statutory or regulatory would need to 
take into account VA’s existing duty to decide initial claims by its 
statutory deadline. Moreover, VA has already announced that it can 
decide all claims not only within 125 days, but do so with 98% 
accuracy. It seems only logical that Congress could hold VA 
accountable to that determination. 
The concern about clogging the system with appeals is at its root 
not really an argument against imposing a deadline on the front end; it 
is an argument in favor of imposing deadlines both at the front end and 
on the back end of the administrative process. To borrow again from 
the SNAP context, not only are state agencies required by regulation to 
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make decisions on SNAP applications within a certain number of days, 
but they are also required to make decisions on SNAP administrative 
appeals within a certain number of days.
150
 For the purpose of clarity, 
this essay chose to focus on initial decisions on claims; but there are 
equally valid reasons for Congress to impose deadlines at other stages 
of the administrative process. Indeed, there may be compelling reasons 
to think imposing deadlines at multiple points in the system will be 
more effective than imposing deadlines at a single step. 
And as to the final set of concerns, the burdens created by 
multiplying appeals should only be a decisive factor if the net result of 
having imposed a statutory deadline is greater delay, not less delay. So 
the question becomes one of degree, rather than whether more appeals 
will create any additional administrative burdens. Moreover, petitions 
for writs for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act are not widely 
utilized by veterans at present because of the existing barriers to 
bringing such issues to the CAVC.
 
So, perhaps not much will be lost 
theoretically if petitions for writs are more difficult to file or more 
difficult to win. More substantively, it may be possible to argue to the 
CAVC that the availability of an administrative appeal is not fatal to a 
petition either because such an appeal is inadequate given the 
underlying right at stake and/or that irreparable injury to the veteran 
would occur in the absence of writ.
151
 One should think that with the 
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passion and creativity of veterans and their advocates, introducing a 
statutory deadline for deciding claims would not, in the end, operate to 




Given how much frustration Congress has expressed about 
systemic failures at VA, it is appropriate to look anew to Congress—as 
opposed only to VA or the courts—for solutions at this particular 
moment in time. This is especially so, given the way existing statutes 
and doctrines have combined to deprive veterans of meaningful 
administrative and judicial enforcement tools to address delays at VA. 
Imposing statutory deadlines upon VA for issuing decisions in the 
service-connected disability compensation program is one potential 
reform Congress should consider. In doing so, Congress would be well 
advised to consider how and when deadlines are deployed in other 
large-scale government entitlement programs, including programs 
such as SNAP, that might otherwise appear too dissimilar to the VA 
disability program to warrant comparison. Taking into account social 
science research about the effect of different kinds of deadlines in 
different contexts and about participant assessments of procedural 
justice within adjudication systems can be valuable to this effort. 
The reform proposed here has admittedly only been sketched out in 
broad strokes. Substantively, it is a modest reform in many respects; it 
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is far from a cure-all for delay. And it does not reflect a large-scale 
overhaul of the basic structure of a VA system that is antiquated in 
many ways. But it does reflect certain fundamental values that should 
animate any reforms to the VA system, whether large scale or small 
scale: expanding enforcement tools, applying lessons learned from 
past VA failures, and treating veterans with dignity. 
 
